According to Skow (2016 Skow ( , 2017 , correct answers to why-questions only cite causes or grounds, but not non-accidental regularities. Accounts that cite non-accidental regularities typically confuse second-level reasons with first-level reasons. Only causes and grounds are first-level reasons why. Non-accidental regularities are second-level reasons why. I first show that Skow's arguments for the accusation of confusion depend on the independent thesis that only citations of first-level reasons why are (parts of) answers to why-questions. Then, I argue that this thesis is false. Consequently, the claim that correct answers to why-questions only cite causes or grounds is refuted as well. 
Introduction
Skow's theory of reasons why (2016, 2017) is framed in terms of a theory of answers to why-questions regarding the "[...] occurrence of a concrete event" (2016, 27) . A central claim is that correct answers to such why-questions only cite causes or (partial) grounds of the event in question, but not non-accidental regularities (2016, 3, 2017, 907) . This claim is based on a distinction between different levels of reasons why. Only causes and grounds are 'first-level reasons why.' Non-accidental regularities are 'second-level reasons why.' Skow argues that accounts that cite non-accidental regularities in answers to why-questions typically confuse second-level reasons with first-level reasons (2016, chapter 4, 2017) . This accusation is crucial to Skow's rebuttals of (putative) non-causal explanations, such as mathematical explanations (ibid.).
The level distinction plays an important role in Skow's account. Unsurprisingly, it has been disputed (e.g., Baumgartner 2017; Pincock 2017; Lange 2018, 36) . However, in what follows, I argue that even if the distinction were granted and only causes and grounds were first-level reasons why, Skow's accusation of confusion and his central claim that correct answers to why-questions only cite causes or grounds can be refuted. I first show that Skow's arguments for the accusation as well as his arguments for the central claim crucially depend on the independent thesis that only citations of first-level reasons why are (parts of) answers to why-questions. Then, I argue that this thesis is false. Skow's arguments against the claim that some answers to why-questions are conjunctions of citations of a first-level reason why and its second-level reason why can be rebutted, and there are plausible arguments in favor of that claim.
Like Skow, I am exclusively concerned with why-questions concerning particular events. 2 2 A putative confusion of levels of reasons why According to several accounts, non-accidental regularities (such as laws) need or could be cited in correct answers to why-questions.
1 The deductive-nomological (D-N) account (1948),
Friedman's account (1974), Railton's account (1978) , and Kitcher's account (1989) include law-like statements. Salmon and Lewis allow for citing causal regularities (Salmon 1984, 262, 274; Lewis 1986 ). Woodward and Hitchcock include invariant generalizations (2003).
According to Lange, some answers to why-questions appeal to necessities (2013). An explanation for someone's not being able to cross all of Königsberg's bridges exactly once cites both that the bridge arrangement has a particular property and that it is necessary that if a bridge arrangement has this property, one cannot cross all of the bridges exactly once (2013, .
According to Skow, all these accounts are mistaken. Correct answers to why-questions only cite causes or grounds, but not non-accidental regularities (2016, chapter 4.3, 2017) . 2 He argues that the mistake is due to a confusion of different levels of reasons why (2017). For instance, Woodward's account "[...] rests on a confusion of levels of reasons why in much the same way the DN model did forty years earlier" (2016, 95) . Before I turn to evaluating this accusation, I introduce the different levels of reasons why.
Reasons why
Skow follows accounts that tie why-questions to reasons why (2016, 26-27; examples: Achinstein 1975, 29-30; Brogaard 2009, 461; Stanley 2011, 209) . The basic form of answers to why-questions is 'One reason why p is that q.'
Reasons why are particular facts (2016, 35 causes and grounds: Only causes and (partial) grounds are first-level reasons why.
His argumentative strategy is to take causes and grounds as initially plausible and to defend it against putative counterexamples. I do not discuss non-accidental regularities and causes and grounds, but take them for granted (for some discussion see, e.g., Baumgartner 2017; Pincock 2017; Lange 2018, 36) . Instead, in what follows, I challenge Skow's claims about second-level reasons why and answers to why-questions.
The accusation of confusion revisited
Let us get back to the accusation of confusion. Well, I dropped it from one meter up, and impact speed s is related to drop height by the law s = 2dg (and of course √ 2 * 1 * 9.8 ≈ 4.4). (Skow 2017, 909) This is a fine response. However, this does not mean that the law is a first-level reason why:
My response is a good one, but it does not follow that every part of my response is part of an answer to the question asked. In my view, the first part of my response -"I dropped it from one meter" -is an answer to the explicit question ("why did the rock hit the ground at 4.4 m/s?"), but the second part, the law, is not; it, instead, is an answer to an unasked follow-up why-question, a follow-up question I can anticipate would be asked immediately if I only answered the explicit question. The follow-up is: why is the fact that I dropped it from one meter up a reason why it hit the ground at 4.4 m/s? (Skow 2017, 910-911) So, Skow's stance is that neither citing the law nor its application is part of the answer to the question 'Why did the rock hit the ground at 4.4 m/s?' They are just part of a good response to it. The law citation is an answer to an anticipated follow-up question. The confusion of different levels of reasons why is a confusion of good responses and proper answers. The same holds true in the case of the Königsberg bridges example. Skow suggests that Lange mistakenly takes a second-level reason (the necessity of not being able to cross all of the bridge exactly once) to be part of the answer to the relevant why-question (2016, chapter 5.3, 2017, 913-914 
Arguments for excluding second-level reasons why
According to Skow, citations of second-level reasons are only parts of a good response to an asked why-question, but not proper parts of the answer to it. His reasoning reveals two The second argument looks more promising. If we accept that non-accidental regularities are not first-level reasons why p, it seems difficult to argue that a citation of them, taken by itself, answers the why-question. However, even if so, the second argument can be rebutted.
That a proposition, taken by itself, is not an answer to a question does not mean that it could not be a part of an answer. Take the question 'How did you rescue her?' and as a reply 'I jumped into the water, swam five meters, grabbed her, and brought her ashore.' 'I swam five meters', taken by itself, is not an answer to the question. But it is nonetheless a part of the conjunction, and the latter is an answer to the question.
A third argument Skow might want to offer is that including citations of second-level reasons why would amount to giving up his simple account of answers to why-questions.
Arguably, the answer 'The drop height is one meter and s = 2dg' could not be stated in 
Arguments against excluding second-level reasons why
In order to argue against why-questions, one might argue that all answers to why-questions need to cite non-accidental regularities, as Hempel would argue (cf. 1965, 349) . One has to answer the follow-up question 'What does F 1 have to do with E?' in order to have an answer to the why-question. However, it suffices to argue for the weaker claim that some answers to a why-question are a conjunction of a citation of a first-level reason why and a citation of its second-level reason why. So, let us turn to arguments for such conjunctions.
My first argument is concerned with the nature of complete answers to why-questions.
Questions are not understood as speech acts here, but as the content that is expressed by interrogative sentences (Skow 2016, 26-27; see also, e.g., van Fraassen 1980, 137-38) .
Answers are understood as propositions. An important issue discussed is whether answers have to be determined relative to some subject. Are answers always answers for some subject? If they were, one could rebut why-questions as follows: In at least some cases, what Skow considers to be the complete answer is not a complete answer for every subject who lacks additional knowledge. Take the following example by Lange (2013) : A mother has three children and twenty-three strawberries. According to Lange, the facts that jointly explain why she failed to distribute the strawberries equally among them are that she has three children, twenty-three strawberries, and that three does not divide twenty-three. According to Skow, the only facts that explain are the first two (2016, 112-13; 2018, 15) . So, the complete answer to the question 'Why did Jane fail to distribute the strawberries equally?' is 'There are exactly two reasons why she failed: She has three children and she has twenty-three strawberries.' As Skow notes himself, " [i] ncluding only the reasons why Jane failed is apt to leave one's audience unsatisfied" (2016, 114) . This is understated: Arguably, the putative complete answer is unsatisfying for everyone who does not know know (or recognize the relevance of the fact) that three does not divide twenty-three. But if knowledge or recognition of the latter is necessary for considering an answer to the question satisfying, it seems plausible that the fact that three does not divide twenty-three is cited in the complete answer as to why Jane failed to distribute the strawberries equally. Something similar could be true in the impact speed example. Just stating that the drop height was one meter is not a complete answer for everyone who does not know how drop height and impact speed are related. A complete answer to this question cites the law or some other relevant non-accidental regularity. (Again, this does not mean that the law is a first-level reason why.) This argument is not a pragmatic argument; it is based on an assumption about the semantics of answers.
What if answers were not determined relative to some subject? In this case, one could rebut why-questions as follows: Every question has a subject matter, i.e., a queried property or relation. For instance, the subject matter of 'Who robbed the bank?' is the property of being someone who robbed the bank in question. A complete answer to this question specifies all entities who fulfill this property. What is the subject matter of a why-question? One proposal that is general enough to capture the variety of why-questions is that the subject matter of a why-question is the property of being something the event in question (explanatorily) depends on (adopted from Kim 1994) . First-level reasons why fulfill this property. However, this also holds for true for second-level reasons why. That Jane failed to distribute the strawberries equally among her children also depends on the fact that three does not divide twenty-three (irrespective of whether the latter is a necessary or a contingent fact). 4 That the impact speed was 4.4 m/s also depends on the fact that s = 2dg, and so on. That is why complete answers can cite non-accidental regularities in addition to citing first-level reasons why.
My second argument is concerned with the relation between the answer to the follow-up 
